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Humans are better at integrating desirable information into their beliefs than undesirable information. This asymmetry poses an evolutionary
puzzle, as it can lead to an underestimation of risk and thus failure to take precautionary action. Here, we suggest a mechanism that can speak to
this conundrum. In particular, we show that the bias vanishes in response to perceived threat in the environment. We report that an improve-
ment in participants’ tendency to incorporate bad news into their beliefs is associated with physiological arousal in response to threat indexed by
galvanic skin response and self-reported anxiety. This pattern of results was observed in a controlled laboratory setting (Experiment I), where
perceived threat was manipulated, and in firefighters on duty (Experiment II), where it naturally varied. Such flexibility in how individuals
integrate information may enhance the likelihood of responding to warnings with caution in environments rife with threat, while maintaining a
positivity bias otherwise, a strategy that can increase well-being.
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Introduction
Whether a piece of news is good or bad is critical in determining
whether it will alter our beliefs. In particular, people readily in-
corporate favorable news into their existing beliefs, yet tend to
underweight the strength of unfavorable information (Eil and
Rao, 2011; Sharot et al., 2011; Mobius et al., 2012; Kuzmanovic et
al., 2015, 2016; Wiswall and Zafar, 2015; Kuzmanovic and
Rigoux, 2017; Lefebvre et al., 2017). For example, when learning
that their risk of experiencing future aversive events, such as rob-
bery, is higher than they had expected, people are less likely to
integrate these data into prior beliefs relative to a situation in
which they learn that their risk is lower than expected (Sharot et
al., 2011). The same pattern emerges when people receive desir-
able and undesirable information about their financial prospects
(Wiswall and Zafar, 2015) or feedback about their intellectual
abilities (Eil and Rao, 2011; Mobius et al., 2012), personality
(Korn et al., 2012), and physical traits (Eil and Rao, 2011). This is
known as a valence-dependent learning asymmetry (Sharot and
Garrett, 2016).
Incorporating desirable information about the self at a higher
rate than undesirable information (Korn et al., 2012) will subse-
quently lead to overconfidence and optimistically biased predic-
tions (Sharot et al., 2011). On the upside, an optimistic outlook,
even when biased, can improve physical and mental health (Tay-
lor and Brown, 1988) and boost motivation (Bandura, 1989),
exploration (Tiger, 1979), and persistence (Sherman, 1980), thus
enhancing success and well-being (for review, see Chang, 2001).
However, ignoring negative information can result in faulty as-
sessment and lack of precautionary action leading to, for exam-
ple, ill preparedness in the face of natural disasters and financial
market bubbles (Shefrin, 2009) .
These apparent costs present a conundrum: Why have humans
evolved a bias in learning that leads to systematic errors in judgment?
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Significance Statement
The human tendency to be overly optimistic has mystified scholars and lay people for decades: How could biased beliefs have been
selected over unbiased beliefs? Scholars have suggested that although the optimism bias can lead to negative outcomes, including
financial collapse and war, it can also facilitate health and productivity. Here, we demonstrate that a mechanism generating the
optimism bias, namely asymmetric information integration, evaporates under threat. Such flexibility could result in enhanced
caution in dangerous environments while supporting an optimism bias otherwise, potentially increasing well-being.
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The common answer is that people make errors that are costly in
certain situations because those errors are advantageous in other
situations, and on balance the benefits outweigh the costs (McKay
and Dennett, 2009). There is another possibility, though, that the
asymmetry fluctuates in response to environmental demands. For
example, in relatively safe surroundings, where potential harm is
low, an asymmetry in information integration may be prominent
leading to biased expectations. Yet in environments rife with threats,
a physiological/psychological response may trigger changes to how
information is integrated leading to more balanced information in-
tegration, which may be adaptive in environments where potential
costs are high.
Because affect provides an internal signal about the external
context, it could potentially be used to adaptively modulate cog-
nitive biases. Specifically, we suggest that the key is a learning
mechanism that is modulated by the two core aspects of affect:
valence and arousal. A valence-dependent learning mechanism
biases judgments, and an arousal-dependent switch controls the
degree and perhaps sign of the bias.
To test this prediction, we exposed participants to an acute
threat manipulation in the laboratory (Experiment I) or tested
participants in a real-life environment (firefighters tested on call;
Experiment II). After measuring indicators of arousal, stress, and
anxiety, participants completed the belief update task (Sharot et
al., 2011, 2012a,b; Moutsiana et al., 2013, 2015; Chowdhury et al.,
2014; Garrett and Sharot, 2014; Garrett et al., 2014; Korn et al.,
2014; Kuzmanovic et al., 2015, 2016; Kappes et al., 2018; Fig. 1).
Past studies have shown that participants put more weight on
good news (i.e., that a negative life event is less likely to occur than
expected; Fig. 1, left) compared with bad news (i.e., that a nega-
tive event is more likely to occur than expected; Fig. 1, right) in
altering beliefs in this task. Here, we test whether heightened
response to threat abolishes this bias.
Materials and Methods
Experimental design and statistical analysis: Experiment I
Participants
Thirty-six participants recruited via the University College London par-
ticipant pool participated in the study. Participants gave informed con-
sent and were paid for their participation. The study was approved by the
Research Ethics Committee of University College London. One partici-
pant’s responses resulted in only two good news trials (of a possible 40),
which prevented us from calculating a meaningful information integra-
tion parameter (we define how we calculate information integration pa-
rameters below); thus, this participant’s data had to be excluded. Two
participants’ cortisol samples were insufficient for analysis, and samples
of six participants who were suspected to have depression (Beck Depres-
sion Inventory score 10) were never sent to be analyzed. Thus, analysis
that includes cortisol scores is given for n  27. Each participant was
randomly assigned to either the threat manipulation condition (13 fe-
males, 6 males; mean age, 26.37 years; standard deviation (SD), 6.58) or
the control condition (10 females, 6 males; mean age, 24.94 years; SD,
3.82).
Manipulation procedure
We designed the experiment such that the perceived threat was unrelated
to the information presented in the task. Thus, we could test whether the
effect of perceived threat on information integration was general rather
than specific to the source of the threat itself.
Participants assigned to the threat manipulation group were told that
they would be exposed to an uncomfortable, stressful event at the end of
the study. Specifically, they were informed that, at the end of the exper-
iment, they would be required to deliver a speech on a surprise topic,
which would be recorded on video and judged live by a panel of staff
members. They were shown an adjacent room across a double mirror
Figure 1. Behavioral task. On each trial, participants were presented with a short description of an adverse event and asked to estimate how likely this event was to occur to them in the future.
They were then presented with the probability of that event occurring to someone from the same age, location, and socioeconomic background as them. The second session was the same as the first
except that the average probability of the event to occur was not presented. Shown are examples of trials for which the participant’s estimate was higher or lower than the statistical information
provided leading to receipt of good news (left) and bad news (right), respectively. Note that the blue and red boxes are just for illustration and did not appear in the actual experiment.
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window where chairs and tables were already organized for the panel. In
addition, participants were presented with six difficult mathematical
problems that they were asked to try and solve in 30 s. This manipu-
lation is a variation of the Trier Social Stress Test (TSST; Birkett,
2011) with the main difference between the typical TSST procedure
and the one used here being that participants were threatened by the
possibility of a stressful social event and completed the main task
under threat, but the threat was never executed. Having the partici-
pants believe the stressful event will take place at the end of the task,
rather than before, increased the likelihood that participants’ arousal
levels remained high throughout the task. Participants assigned to the
control condition were informed that, at the end of the experiment,
they would be required to write a short essay on a surprise topic,
which would not be judged. They were then presented with six ele-
mentary mathematical problems to solve in 30 s.
Manipulation check
We examine whether the threat manipulation resulted in the following
psychological and physiological changes, which are typically observed in
studies using variations of TSST (Birkett, 2011).
Self-report. Before and after the induction procedure, participants
filled out a short form of the state scale of the Spielberger State Trait
Anxiety Inventory developed by Marteau and Bekker (1992). Partici-
pants reported their current anxiety state according to six statements
(e.g., I am worried) on a four-point Likert scale (1, not at all, to 4, very
much). Possible scores range from 6 to 24 with high scores indicating
high levels of state anxiety.
Skin conductance level. Skin conductance level (SCL) is an index of
sympathetic tone that reflects changes in autonomic arousal. Skin con-
ductance was recorded for 2 min before and after induction while par-
ticipants stared at a fixation cross using disposable electrodermal gel
electrodes (EL507, Biopac) attached to the distal phalanx of the pointer
and middle fingers of the participants’ nondominant hand. Skin con-
ductance responses were monitored using a MP36R system (BIOPAC
Systems) and analyzed with BIOPAC software AcqKnowledge. The dif-
ference in mean SCL in each period was taken as a change in participants’
autonomic arousal levels.
Cortisol level. To measure changes in participants’ cortisol levels, saliva
samples were collected using Salivette collection devices (Salimetrics).
Four samples were taken at different time points: before the induction
procedure (baseline, t0), immediately after the induction procedure but
before undertaking the task (10 min after the threat/control manipula-
tion, t1), halfway through the task (30 min after the threat/control ma-
nipulation, t2), and after the task and completion of postexperiment
questionnaires (1 h after the threat/control manipulation, t3). The
experiment was conducted between 2 and 4 P.M., restricted to these
times to control for the diurnal cycle of cortisol. Samples were stored at
80°C before being assayed. Analysis of salivary cortisol was com-
pleted by Salimetrics. Intra-assay and interassay coefficients of varia-
tion were all below 6.1% [mean, 1.5%; SD, 1.2]. Cortisol values were
measured in micrograms per deciliter. Shapiro–Wilk (SW) tests on
cortisol levels at each sample period revealed that these were not
normally distributed (one-sample SW  0.01 for all four sample
intervals). As a result, cortisol values were log transformed. Since
cortisol stress response has a temporal delay [mediated by the slower
time scale hypothalamic–pituitary–adrenal (HPA) axis], it is difficult
to precisely align the time of the cortisol response to perceived levels
of threat at different points in the task. Because of this, the main
cortisol measure we used in the study was calculated as the mean
difference between cortisol levels at time periods t1, t2, and t3 from
baseline cortisol levels at t0, as done previously (Lighthall et al., 2013;
Otto et al., 2013; Lenow et al., 2017). This measure represents the
average cortisol response throughout the duration of task perfor-
mance. Below is the formula we used to derive this index, where log
cort is the natural log-transformed cortisol (cort) concentrations:
log cort  




The task was adopted from past studies (Sharot et al., 2011, 2012a,b;
Moutsiana et al., 2013, 2015; Chowdhury et al., 2014; Garrett and Sharot,
2014; Garrett et al., 2014; Korn et al., 2014).
Stimuli
Stimuli (80 short descriptions of different negative life events, e.g., do-
mestic burglary, card fraud) were separated into two lists, each contain-
ing 40 events. Participants were randomly assigned one of the two lists of
40 events at the start of the experiment. For each event, the average
probability of that event occurring at least once to someone from the
United Kingdom within the same age range as the participants was cal-
culated from data compiled from online resources (including the Office
for National Statistics and PubMed). Very rare or very common events
were not included; all event probabilities lay between 10 and 70%. To
ensure that the range of possible overestimation was equal to the range of
possible underestimation, participants were told that the range of prob-
abilities lay between 3 and 77%, and they were only permitted to enter
estimates within this range. Note that differences between the average
probabilities provided to participants and the actual probabilities for the
sample of participants tested cannot explain differences between the two
groups, as we randomly assign participants to either the threat manipu-
lation condition or the control condition.
Behavioral task
Participants completed a practice session comprising three trials before
beginning the main experiment (Fig. 1). The main experiment com-
prised 40 trials. On each trial, 1 of 40 adverse life events was presented for
3 s, and participants were asked to estimate how likely the event was to
happen to them in the future. Participants had up to 5 s to respond. If
participants had already experienced an event in their lifetime, they were
instructed to estimate the likelihood of that event happening to them
again in the future. If the participant failed to respond, that trial was
excluded from all subsequent analyses (Mean number of missed re-
sponses, 1.31; SD, 1.39). After presentation of a fixation cross (5–10 s
jittered), participants were then presented with the base rate of the event
in a demographically similar population for 2 s, followed by a fixation
cross (5–10 s jittered). In a second session, immediately after the first,
participants were asked again to provide estimates of their likelihood of
encountering the same events so that we could assess how they updated
their estimate in response to the information presented.
Note that studies have shown that the update bias exists both when clas-
sifying trials according to participants’ estimates of self-risk and when trials
are classified according to estimates of base rates (Garrett and Sharot, 2014;
Kuzmanovic et al., 2015). Thus, we used the traditional design and analysis
here (Sharot et al., 2011). Moreover, multiple past studies have shown that
the amount of update bias does not alter whether participants are asked to
estimate the likelihood of the event happening in the future or the likelihood
of the event not happening in the future (Sharot et al., 2011; Garrett and
Sharot, 2014; Garrett et al., 2014). Thus, scores are not driven by response to
high and low numbers but rather by valence per se. As this has been estab-
lished in the past, we used the standard version of the task here (i.e., eliciting
estimation of an event happening).
Memory control
To test for memory effects, participants were asked at the end of the
experiment to provide the actual probability previously presented of each
event. Memory errors were calculated as the absolute difference between
the probability previously presented and the participants’ recollection of
that statistic: memory error  probability presented  recollection of
probability presented.
Other controls
At the end of the experiment, participants also rated stimuli on six-point
scales for vividness [for the question “How vividly could you imagine this
event?” (1, not at all vivid, to 6, very vividly)], familiarity [for the question
“Regardless if this event has happened to you before, how familiar do you
feel it is to you from TV, friends, movies, and so on?” (1, not at all familiar, to
6, very familiar)], prior experience [for the question “Has this event hap-
pened to you before?” (1, never, to 6, very often)], emotional arousal [for the
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question “When you imagine this event, how emotionally arousing do you
find the image in your mind?” (1, not at all arousing, to 6, very arousing)],
and negativity [for the question “How negative would this event be/is this
event for you?” (1, not negative at all, to 6, very negative)].
Statistical analysis
Trials were partitioned according to participants’ first estimates into ones
in which participants received good news (i.e., the probability presented was
lower than the first estimate of their own probability; Fig. 1, left) or bad news
(i.e., the probability presented was higher; Fig. 1, right). Although informa-
tion can be better or worse than expected, all stimuli are negative (i.e., rob-
bery, card fraud); thus, comparison is never between positive and negative
stimuli but between information that is better or worse than expected.
Trials for which the estimation error was zero were excluded from
subsequent analyses as these could not be categorized into either condi-
tion (Mean number of uncategorizable trials, 0.89; SD, 0.92).
For each trial, an estimation error term was calculated as the unsigned
difference between the probability presented and participants’ first estimate
on that trial: estimation error  probability presented  first estimate.
Update was calculated for each trial such that positive updates indicate
a change toward the probability presented [update (good news)  first
estimate  second estimate] and negative updates indicate a change away
from the probability presented [update (bad news)  second estimate 
first estimate].
Formal models suggest that learning from information that discon-
firms one’s expectations is mediated by a prediction error signal that
quantifies a difference between expectation and outcome (Sutton and
Barto, 1998). We have previously shown that an analogous mechanism
underpins belief updating in this task (Sharot et al., 2011). Specifically,
the absolute difference between participants’ initial estimations and the
information provided (i.e., estimation error  probability presented 
first estimate) predicts subsequent updates, as would be expected from
learning models (Sutton and Barto, 1998). Hence, similar to our previous
studies (Sharot et al., 2011; Moutsiana et al., 2013; Garrett et al., 2014),
we estimated the extent to which participants integrated new informa-
tion into their beliefs by correlating absolute estimation errors and up-
date scores with one another separately for good and bad news trials for
each participant. This resulted in two Pearson correlation values for each
participant: one for good news trials and one for bad news trials. We
denote these Pearson correlation scores as good news (G) and bad news
(B) information integration parameters. Shapiro–Wilk tests were ap-
plied to check that the values of G and B were normally distributed. To
check that the values of G and B were not at floor or ceiling, we con-
ducted one-sample t tests (separately G and B) against values of 0 (to
test for floor effects) and 1 (to test for ceiling effects).
To determine whether information integration from good and/or bad
news was altered by the threat manipulation, the resulting information
integration parameters were submitted to a 2 by 2 ANOVA with valence
(good/bad news) as a repeated measure and group (threat manipulation/
control) as a between-subjects factor.
We identified possible confounds to add as covariates to our analysis as
follows. First, for factors that were not task related and therefore did not
have a valence component (specifically, initial self-reported anxiety, ini-
tial SCL, initial cortisol, and BDI), we conducted independent-sample t
tests (control vs threat manipulation group) for each factor separately to
determine whether a group difference existed (Table 1). For task-related
variables that could be divided by valence (specifically, number of trials,
memory scores, ratings on familiarity, vividness, past experience, nega-
tivity, emotional arousal, and mean first estimates), we calculated the
difference between mean good news and mean bad news for each partic-
ipant for each of these factors. This gives a bias score for each factor for
each subject whereby positive scores indicate a bias toward good news
and negative scores indicate a bias toward bad news. We then conducted
a one-sample t test (vs 0) on each of these scores for each group separately
to isolate those factors that had valence effects in either set of partici-
pants. Next, we conducted a series of independent-sample t tests to com-
pare the control group’s difference scores to the threat manipulation
group’s scores for each factor (this is equivalent to testing for an interac-
tion between valence and group). For all of these tests, we applied a
threshold of p  0.05 and deliberately did not correct for multiple com-
parisons. This is because the purpose was to identify all potential con-
founds; by not correcting, we are being more stringent. Any factor that
showed a group effect or a valence effect was added as a covariate. These
were: initial self-reported anxiety, mean first estimates, ratings of vivid-
ness, familiarity, past experience, and emotional arousal (Table 1).
To explore whether differences in information integration related
to any of the specific physiological and psychological changes, we
constructed a general linear model (GLM) with  entered as the
dependent variable and changes in SCL, self-report anxiety, and cor-
tisol as independent variables. This was done separately for informa-
tion integration parameters for good (G) and bad (B) news. To
control for general changes in information integration and allow us to
detect valence-specific effects, we entered information integration
parameters for good news (G) as a covariate when examining infor-
mation integration parameters for bad news (B) and vice versa
(Moutsiana et al., 2013). In addition, following the same selection
procedure outlined above, we controlled for any variable where there
was a significant ( p  0.05) difference between groups, between types
of information (i.e., valence), or a group * valence interaction by
including these in the GLM as covariates.
For B, the formula for the regression in full is as follows: B  0 
1 * change in SCL  2 * change in self-report  3 * change in cortisol 
4 * mean initial estimate  5 * initial self-report anxiety  6 * mean bad
news vividness rating  7 * mean bad news familiarity rating  8 * mean
prior experience bad news rating  9 * mean emotional arousal bad
news rating  10 * G.
For G, the formula for this was as follows: G  0  1 * change in
SCL  2 * change in self-report  3 * change in cortisol  4 * mean
initial estimate  5 * initial self-report anxiety  6 * mean good news
vividness rating  7 * mean good news familiarity rating  8 * mean
prior experience good news rating  9 * mean emotional arousal good
news rating  10 * B.
Finally, we reran the analysis above, this time controlling for within-
subject covariates at the within-subject level and between-subject factors
at the between-subject level. Specifically, for each participant we com-
Table 1. BDI, initial self-report Spielberger State Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI),






BDI and baseline stress levels
BDI 5.79 (5.23) 4.69 (3.22)
Initial self-report STAIa 10.37 (2.65) 8.63 (1.36)
Initial SCL 6.27 (3.29) 5.90 (3.20)
Initial cortisol (log transformed) 1.99 (0.59) 1.79 (0.53)
Task variables
First estimates 29.82 (5.62)b 31.05 (5.89)b
Subjective scales questionnaire
(1, low, to 6, high) Bias (good news– bad news)
Vividness 0.41 (0.72)b 0.72 (0.65)b
Familiarity 0.30 (0.69) 0.49 (0.62)b
Prior experience 0.18 (0.61) 0.33 (0.41)b
Emotional arousal 0.33 (0.63)b 0.13 (0.86)
Negativity 0.20 (0.49) 0.13 (0.58)
Other task-related variables
Number of trials 1.58 (8.99) 1.56 (9.70)
Memory errors 1.23 (3.16) 0.21 (4.52)
Estimation errors (absolute) 0.82 (5.27) 1.11 (5.84)
Update 2.60 (12.67) 4.21 (7.83)b
Note that estimation errors and update (the final two rows) are the variables used to compute the information
integration parameters (G and B ) for each participant.
aDifference between the threat manipulation and control groups, tested using an independent-sample t test ( p 
0.05).
bSignificant effect of valence ( p  0.05), tested using a one-sample t test on the bias scores (difference between
good and bad news) on each group separately.
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puted an alternative set of information integration parameters, one for
good news (G_partial) and one for bad news (B_partial), by carrying out a
series of partial correlations in which absolute estimation error and up-
date were the two variables of interest. Within-subject covariates, iden-
tified as above (first estimate, vividness, familiarity, past experience, and
emotional arousal), were controlled for on a trial-by-trial basis. We ex-
amined whether these alternative information integration parameters for
bad news (B_partial) related to change in self-report and/or change in
SCL controlling for any additional between-subject confounds as above
(initial self-report anxiety ratings and information integration for good
news). This was done by entering alternative information integration
parameters for bad news (B_partial) as the dependent variable into two
GLMs as follows: B_partial  0  1 * change in self-report  2 *
initial self-report anxiety  3 * G_partial and B_partial  0  1 *
change in SCL  2 * initial self-report  3 * G_partial.
We then examined the significance of the regression weights in each
GLM for change in self-report and change in SCL. To visualize the effect
of each of these (see Fig. 4), we generated two partial regression plots.
These are scatterplots of the residuals of the dependent variable
(B_partial) and the independent variable (either change in self-report or
change in SCL) when these are regressed on the rest of the independent
variables (initial self-report and G_partial).
We ran the equivalent analysis for good news (G_partial) as follows:
G_partial  0  1 * change in self-report  2 * initial self-report 
3 * B_partial and G_partial  0  1 * change in SCL  2 * initial
self-report  3 * B_partial.
Experimental design and statistical analysis: Experiment II
Participants
Thirty-three operational staff stationed across 17 fire stations within the
South Metro Fire and Rescue Authority of the State of Colorado in the
United States participated in the study. Five of these participants failed to
complete the study, leaving 28 participants (1 female, 27 males; mean age,
43.15 years; SD, 9.87). A link to an online version of the experiment was sent
by email to operational staff inviting them to participate in the study while on
duty. Employees were given 18 d to attempt the experiment. They were
permitted to take the experiment once in this time period and were explicitly
requested to do so while on shift (i.e., in the station between calls). Partici-
pation in the experiment was anonymous, voluntary, and unpaid.
Task, stimuli, and control variables
An online version of the task used in Experiment I was designed using
Qualtrics Survey software (Qualtrics). The task began by asking basic
demographic questions (age, gender, marital status, level of education,
and number of children) and some questions pertaining to their work
(including how long they had worked in the service, how many people
they supervised, number of emergencies they went on, and what their
rank in the service was) and social environment (social support at work
and outside and stress experienced at home).
After providing this information, participants read task instructions on
screen at their own pace and then undertook a practice session comprising
three practice trials. As in Experiment I, stimuli (80 short descriptions of
different negative life events; the majority of these were the same as those
used in Experiment I, but 18 events were exchanged with alternative negative
life events) were separated into two lists, each containing 40 negative life
events. Participants were randomly assigned one of the two lists of 40 events
at the start of the experiment. The task was the same as in Experiment I,
except that there was only one fixation cross displayed in each session (for
1 s) after participants submitted estimates (i.e., in the first session, unlike in
Experiment I, a second fixation cross was not displayed after base rate pre-
sentation). Furthermore, mindful of the firefighters’ unpredictable time
constraints, memory for the information given and subjective ratings (past
experience with the event and negativity) were elicited for half the stimuli
and participants completed a short version of the state scale of the self-report
at the beginning of the study (Chlan et al., 2003), without providing physi-
ological measures of autonomic arousal.
Statistical analysis
Linear regressions were performed using ordinary least squares imple-
mented using SPSS version 25 for bad news and good news separately,
with  entered as the dependent variable and self-reported state anxiety
entered as the independent variable. To rule out potential confounds, we
followed a similar procedure as in Experiment I. Specifically, we sepa-
rately tested whether a range of potential confounding factors had va-
lence effects. These factors were mean first estimates, memory scores,
ratings of negativity, ratings of past experience, and number of trials. We
did this by calculating the difference between mean good news and mean
bad news for each participant for each of these factors. This gives a bias
score for each factor for each subject whereby positive scores indicate a
bias toward good news and negative scores indicate a bias toward bad
news. We then conducted a one-sample t test (vs 0) on each of these
scores to identify factors that had valence effects. We used a threshold of
p  0.05 and deliberately did not correct for multiple comparisons. This
is because the purpose was to identify all potential confounds; by not
correcting, we are being more stringent. Any factor that showed a valence
effect was then added as a covariate. These were mean first estimates,
ratings of past experience, and number of trials (Table 2).
To test for a relationship between anxiety and the asymmetry within the
firefighters (i.e., preferential updating for bad news over good news), we
calculated an information integration bias score for each participant. This is
simply the difference between G and B. A score of 0 indicates no bias in
information integration in either direction, whereas positive scores indicate
greater information integration for good news relative to bad news and
negative scores the opposite. We then examined whether the information
integration bias related to self-reported anxiety as follows: information inte-
gration bias score  0  1 * self-reported anxiety  2 * mean initial
estimate  3 * mean prior experience bias score  4 * number of trials
bias score.
Next, we ran a GLM for each of the two sets of information integration
parameters (G and B) separately. To ensure effects were valence spe-
cific rather than reflecting general changes in information integration,
good news (G) was also added as a covariate when examining informa-
tion integration parameters for bad news (B) and vice versa when ex-
amining information integration for good news.
For the bad news information integration parameter (B), the formula
for the regression in full is as follows: B  0  1 * self-reported
anxiety  2 * mean initial estimate  3 * mean prior experience bad
news rating  4 * number of bad news trials  5 * G.
For the good news information integration parameter (G), the for-
mula for the regression in full therefore is as follows: G  0  1 *
self-reported anxiety  2 * mean initial estimate  3 * mean prior expe-
rience good news rating  4 * number of good news trials  5 * B.
Finally, we reran the analysis above, this time controlling for within-
subject covariates at the within-subject level and between-subject factors at
the between-subject level. Specifically, for each participant we computed an
alternative set of information integration parameters, one for good news
(G_partial) and one for bad news (B_partial), by carrying out a series of partial
correlations in which absolute estimation error and update were the two




First estimatesa 31.22 (6.96)
Subjective scales questionnaire
(1, low, to 6, high) Bias (good news– bad news)
Prior experiencea 0.54 (0.94)
Negativity 0.31 (0.90)
Other task-related variables
Number of trialsa 10.89 (9.41)
Memory errors 2.18 (6.51)
Estimation errors (absolute)a 2.91 (5.16)
Updatea 9.49 (12.04)
Note that estimation errors and update (the final two rows) are the variables used to compute the information
integration parameters (G and B ) for each participant.
aSignificant effect of valence ( p  0.05), tested using a one-sample t test on the mean bias scores (difference
between good and bad news) for each participant.
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variables of interest. Within-subject covariates (first estimates) were con-
trolled for on a trial-by-trial basis (note that it was not possible to control for
past experience on a trial-by-trial basis here because participants in this study
completed ratings only for a subset of events). We then examined whether
these alternative information integration parameters for bad news
(B_partial) related to self-reported anxiety, controlling for additional
between-subject covariates (number of bad news trials and information in-
tegration for good news) at the between-subject level. This was done by
entering alternative information integration parameters for bad news
(B_partial) as the dependent variable into a GLM as follows: B_partial 0
1 * self-reported anxiety 2 * number of bad news trials 3 * G_partial.
We then examined the significance of the regression weight for self-
reported anxiety.
We ran the same analysis for information integration parameters for
good news (G_partial) as follows: G_partial  0  1 * self-reported
anxiety  2 * number of good news trials  3 * B_partial.
To visualize the effect of each of these (see Fig. 5), we generated two partial
regression plots. These are scatterplots of the residuals of the dependent
variable (B_partial or G_partial) and the independent variable of interest
(self-reported anxiety) when these are regressed on the rest of the indepen-
dent variables (number of bad news trials and G_partial when examining




Threat manipulation was successful
Subjective self-reports of anxiety and physiological measures of
SCL and cortisol showed that the manipulation was effective. Spe-
cifically, after the manipulation, self-report anxiety (Fig. 2a) and SCL
(Fig. 2b) showed an increase relative to before (baseline), which was
greater in the threat manipulation group relative to controls (self-
reported anxiety: t(33)  4.16, p  0.001; SCL: t(33)  3.32, p  0.002;
independent-sample t test). There were no baseline (t0) differences
in cortisol levels between the two groups (t(25)  0.89, p  0.38).
Mean cortisol levels (averaged across t1, t2, and t3) relative to base-
line (t0) showed a trend toward being higher in the threat manipu-
lation group relative to controls (t(25)  1.90, p  0.07). This effect
was driven by a reduction in cortisol levels over time in the control
group (main effect of time at t1, t2, and t3 relative to baseline:
F(2,26)  17.19, p  0.001, repeated-measures ANOVA), an effect
previously observed when participants become familiar with a
novel experiment context (Stones et al., 1999), but an absence of
this common reduction in the threat manipulation group (main
effect of time: F(2,22)  1.00, p  0.25; Fig. 2c). Across partici-
pants, these measures were correlated with each other (self-
report and SCL: r(33)  0.39, p  0.02; SCL and cortisol: r(25) 
0.47, p  0.01; trend for cortisol and self-report: r(25)  0.33,
p  0.09).
Threat eliminates asymmetric information integration
Our results show that the acute threat manipulation eliminated the
well established asymmetry in information integration (Sharot et al.,
2011; Moutsiana et al., 2013; Garrett et al., 2014). Specifically, the
two sets of information integration parameters (G, B) were en-
tered into a group (control/threat) by valence (good news/bad news)
ANOVA controlling for possible confounds (see Materials and
Methods). The analysis revealed a group * valence interaction
Figure 2. Manipulation check. Measures of self-reported state anxiety (a), skin conductance (b), and cortisol levels (c) were greater after manipulation relative to before in the threat
manipulation group compared with the control group. Time points for cortisol measurements are as follows: t0, before threat/control manipulation procedure; t1, immediately after threat/control
manipulation procedure, before undertaking the task (10 min from t0); t2, halfway through the task (30 min from t0); t3, after completion of task and postexperiment questionnaires (1 h
from t0). **p  0.01 independent/paired sample ttest as appropriate; error bars represent SEM.
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(F(1,27)  7.56, p  0.01, p
2  0.22), which also remained if
estimation errors were controlled for (F(1,26)  7.88, p  0.01;
Garrett and Sharot, 2017) and if the difference between number
of good and bad news trials are controlled for (F(1,26)  6.97,
p  0.01).
Post hoc tests revealed that the group * valence interaction was
the result of asymmetric information integration in the control
group, such that the information integration parameter was
larger for good news than bad news (t(15)  3.34, p  0.004,
paired sample t test) but absent in the threat manipulation group
(t(18)  0.92, p  0.25, paired sample t test; Fig. 3). Participants in
the threat manipulation group were more likely to effectively
integrate bad news into their beliefs relative to those in the con-
trol group (significant difference in bad news information inte-
gration parameters B: t(33)  2.44, p  0.02, independent sample
t test), while information integration parameters for good news
(G) did not differ between groups (t(33)  0.611, p  0.250,
independent sample t test). There were no floor or ceiling effects
for G and B in the threat manipulation or control groups (all at
p  0.001, one-sample t tests vs 0 and 1, respectively), and par-
ticipants’ first estimates were not significantly different from the
information provided (t(34)  0.45, p  0.65, one-sample t test
vs 0 on the difference between participants’ first estimates and the
information provided).
Past studies show that asymmetric information integration in
this task is not associated with an asymmetry in memory (Sharot
et al., 2011, 2012a,b; Moutsiana et al., 2013). In fact, asymmetry
in information integration is observed even when the second
estimate is elicited immediately after information is on screen
(Kuzmanovic et al., 2015, 2016; Kuzmanovic and Rigoux, 2017).
Here, we submitted memory scores to a group (threat manipula-
tion/control) by valence (good news/bad news) ANOVA (see Mate-
rials and Methods for details). This did not reveal a main effect of
valence (F(1,33)  1.24, p  0.25), a main effect of group (F(1,33) 
1.03, p  0.25), or an interaction (F(1,33)  0.62, p  0.25). This
suggests that valence-dependent changes in information integra-
tion across groups cannot be attributed to memory or encoding/
attention.
Conducting an ANOVA on partici-
pants’ first estimates with valence (good/
bad news) as a repeated factor and group
(threat/control) as a between-participant
factor revealed no main effect of group
(F(1,33)  1.18, p  0.25), the obvious
main effect of valence (as trials are binned
into good and bad according to first esti-
mates: F(1,33)  278.08, p  0.001) and a
group * valence interaction (F(1,33)  6.71,
p  0.014). The interaction was character-
ized by the threat group providing lower
first estimates than controls for stimuli
that will subsequently be categorized as
good news (t(33)  2.30, p  0.028) but
no significant difference for trials that will
be subsequently categorized as bad news
(t(33)  1.59, p  0.123). Controlling for
the difference between first estimates on
good and bad news trials in the main
ANOVA looking at information integra-
tion parameters did not alter the results
(F(1,26)  5.43, p  0.028).
What, therefore, could account for the
selective fluctuations in information inte-
gration of bad news? To examine which of the changes to the
psychological and physiological measures (SCL, cortisol level,
self-report) could independently explain alterations in informa-
tion integration of bad news, we ran a GLM in which information
integration parameters for bad news (B) were entered as the
dependent variable and changes in self-report, SCL, and cortisol
were the independent variables (all entered together in one re-
gression). To ensure that effects were valance specific and could
not be accounted for by general changes to information integra-
tion, information integration parameters for good news (G)
were added as a covariate as done before [Moutsiana et al., 2013;
note that the same pattern of results pertains if we omit this
covariate (self-reported anxiety: F(1,17)  4.75, p  0.04; SCL:
F(1,17)  8.81, p  0.009)]. We also controlled for all other pos-
sible confounds (see Materials and Methods). The analysis re-
vealed that changes in self-reported anxiety (F(1,16)  6.90, p 
0.02, bi  0.03, p
2  0.30) and change in physiological stress
indicated by SCL (F(1,16)  4.99, p  0.04, bi  0.05, p
2  0.24)
explained the variance in information integration parameters for
bad news, each of which remained significant if estimation errors
were also controlled for (self-reported stress: F(1,15)  4.61, p 
0.048; SCL: F(1,15)  4.67, p  0.047; Garrett and Sharot, 2017).
In other words, participants who showed the greatest increase in
SCL, which reflects the sympathetic component of the autonomic
nervous system stress response (Bechara et al., 1996; Figner and
Murphy, 2011), and self-reported anxiety were most likely to
change their beliefs in proportion to the difference between their
first estimates and the bad news received. Change in cortisol,
which is suggested to reflect the HPA axis component of the stress
response (Gunnar and Quevedo, 2007), did not relate to infor-
mation integration for bad news (F(1,16)  0.46, p  0.25, bi 
0.04, p
2  0.03). The null result for cortisol may indicate either
that the increase in bad news information integration is not as-
sociated specifically with cortisol level increase or a type II error.
Ratings of emotional arousal, familiarity, and information inte-
gration parameters for good news (G) were also significant pre-
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Figure 3. Bias in information integration parameters vanishes under threat manipulation. Whereas the control group showed
asymmetrical information integration parameters () in response to good and bad news, this bias vanished in the threat manip-
ulation group because of an increase in B (information integration parameter for bad news). The group * valence interaction was
significant, controlling for all covariates identified in Table 1 (see Materials and Methods). *p  0.05 independent/paired sample
t test as appropriate; **p  0.01 independent/paired-sample t test as appropriate; error bars represent SEM.
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For completeness, we repeated the analysis on information
integration parameters for good news, G (including informa-
tion integration parameters for bad news, B, and all possible
covariates mentioned above), and found no significant effects
(change in self-report: F(1,16)  0.47, p  0.25, bi  0.01;
change in SCL: F(1,16)  0.61, p  0.25, bi  0.03; change in
cortisol: F(1,16)  0.72, p  0.25, bi  0.07).
Finally, we examined whether the same results are observed
when controlling for within-subject covariates at the within-
subject level and between-subject factors at the between-subject
level. Specifically, for each participant we computed an alterna-
tive set of information integration parameters by correlating ab-
solute estimation error and update controlling for the same
within-subject covariates as above (first estimate, vividness, fa-
miliarity, past experience and emotional arousal), but controlling
for them on a trial-by-trial basis. We then examined whether
these alternative information integration parameters for bad
news related to changes in self-reported anxiety and/or changes
in SCL (additional between-subject factors, initial self-report and
the alternative information integration parameters for good
news, were also entered as control variables). Indeed, both effects
were significant using this approach (change in self-report:
F(1,31)  10.57, p  0.003, bi  0.05; change in SCL: F(1,31)  4.51,
p  0.04, bi  0.08; Fig. 4), while the equivalent analysis on
information integration parameters from good news was not
(change in self-report: F(1,31)  0.001, p   0.25, bi  0.001;
change in SCL: F(1,31)  0.55, p   0.25, bi  0.036).
The results of Experiment I suggested that inducing threat
abolishes valence-dependent asymmetry in information inte-
gration. Thus, the previously observed bias in information
integration (Sharot et al., 2011, 2012a,b; Moutsiana et al.,
2013, 2015; Garrett et al., 2014; Korn et al., 2014; Kuzmanovic
et al., 2015) is not constant but changes with perceived threat
in the environment.
Experiment II
Next, we set out to extend our findings from Experiment I in a
natural setting. Here, we did not fashion a perceived threat but
instead measured anxiety in an environment in which perceived
threats would be naturally volatile. Specifically, firefighters from
the state of Colorado performed the belief update task while on
duty at their respective fire stations. We targeted this group of
participants because they would have a naturally large range of
anxiety levels owing to the volatile nature of their profession.
Changes in cortisol levels were not found to be a significant pre-
dictor of information integration parameters for bad news in
Experiment I. Therefore, we ruled out collecting this as a measure
in Experiment II. Whereas changes in self-reported anxiety and
changes in SCL were both found to be significant predictors in
Experiment I, these two measures were correlated with one an-
other (r(33)  0.39, p  0.02). Since self-reported anxiety had the
larger effect size and was easier to collect, we opted to make this
our main measure.
Self-reported anxiety was significantly correlated (r(26) 
0.51, p  0.01) with the bias in information integration (i.e., G
minus B). In particular, heightened anxiety was associated with
a reduction in the bias. This result remained significant when
controlling for possible confounds (see Materials and Methods;
F(1,23)  6.67, p  0.02, p
2  0.23, bi  0.05).
To examine whether the relationship between heightened
anxiety and reduced bias was the result of increased sensitivity to
bad news, reduced sensitivity to good news, or both, we first
constructed a GLM in which information integration parameters
for bad news (B) were regressed on self-reported anxiety, con-
trolling for possible confounds (mean first estimates, mean rat-
ings of prior experience, and number of bad news trials; see
Materials and Methods for details). In addition, to ensure effects
were valence specific and could not be accounted for by general
changes in information integration, information integration pa-
rameters for good news (G) were also added as a covariate (note,
however, that the self-reported anxiety effect pertains if we omit
this covariate: F(1,23)  9.77, p  0.005). This analysis revealed
Figure 4. Greater integration of bad news related to self-reported anxiety and SCL. After the
manipulation, an increase in both self-reported anxiety (a; bi  0.049, p  0.003, p
2  0.25)
and SCL (b; bi  0.076, p  .042, p
2  0.13) was related to larger information integration
from bad news, correcting for possible confounds. Plotted are the partial regression plots from
two linear models (one for self-report and one for SCL) that control for additional covariates.
Table 3. Parameter estimates of covariates in Experiment I









Initial self-report STAI 0.01 0.01 1.10 0.29 0.04 0.01 0.07
First estimates 0.01 0.01 0.89 0.39 0.01 0.02 0.05
Vividness rating 0.09 0.05 1.84 0.09 0.20 0.01 0.17
Familiarity rating 0.08 0.04 2.16 0.05 0.00 0.16 0.23
Prior experience rating 0.04 0.06 0.76 0.46 0.17 0.08 0.04
Emotional arousal rating 0.13 0.04 3.03 0.01 0.22 0.04 0.37
Information integration
parameter, good news (G )
0.39 0.15 2.60 0.02 0.07 0.71 0.30
First estimates (i.e., mean initial estimations), mean ratings on subjective scales (vividness, familiarity, past expe-
rience, and emotional arousal), and G (information integration parameters for good news) were entered as cova-
riates to account for fluctuations in B (information integration parameters for bad news). STAI, Spielberger State
Trait Anxiety Inventory.
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that self-reported anxiety significantly explained the variance in
information integration parameters for bad news, B (F(1,22) 
10.52, p  0.004, p
2  0.32, bi  0.05; Table 4), an effect that
remained significant if estimation errors are also controlled for
(F(1,21)  9.79, p  0.005; Garrett and Sharot, 2017). The higher
the acute anxiety reported by a firefighter, the more likely the
firefighter was to integrate bad news into beliefs in proportion to
the difference between their first estimations and the information
provided. In this model, information integration from good news
(F(1,22)  4.69, p  0.04) was also a significant predictor of infor-
mation integration from bad news. There were no floor or ceiling
effects for G or B (all at p  0.001, one-sample t tests against
values of 0 and 1).
We then conducted the same analysis on information integra-
tion parameters for good news (G) with information integration
parameters for bad news (B), mean first estimates, mean ratings
of prior experience, and number of good news trials as covariates.
This revealed a nonsignificant trend in the opposite direction
than observed for B (F(1,22)  3.86, p  0.06, p
2  0.15, bi 
0.05), such that greater self-reported anxiety was related to a
trend for less information integration in response to good
news. Information integration parameters for bad news (B)
was also significant (F(1,22)  7.44, p  0.01, p
2  0.25, bi 
0.75).
Finally, we examined whether the same results are observed
when controlling for within-subject covariates at the within-
subject level and between-subject factors at the between-subject
level. Under this alternative approach, higher self-reported anx-
iety was related to greater information integration in response to
bad news (F(1,24)  8.34, p  0.008, bi  0.03; Fig. 5a). For good
news, the opposite effect was found such that higher self-reported
anxiety was related to reduced information integration (F(1,24) 
4.80, p  0.038, bi  0.045; Fig. 5b). It is interesting that this
latter effect was observed only in Experiment 2 and not in Exper-
iment 1, which may indicate that natural real-life threats could
have an especially strong impact on information integration
processes.
These results suggest that anxiety is related to a valence-
dependent enhancement in the ability to adjust beliefs in response
to new information. We highlight that whereas in Experiment I
threat was manipulated and thus causation could be inferred by
comparing the threat manipulation and control groups, Ex-
periment II was conducted to reveal an association in “real
life”. Together, the experiments suggest that under a perceived
threat (whether manipulated or naturally occurring) posi-
tively biased integration of information is not observed.
Discussion
Our results provide evidence that the well documented asymme-
try in belief formation evaporates under perceived threat. Specif-
ically, Experiment I shows that in a low threat environment,
individuals integrated information asymmetrically, faithfully in-
corporating good news into their existing beliefs while relatively
disregarding bad news (Eil and Rao, 2011; Sharot et al., 2011).
Under perceived threat, however, this asymmetry disappeared;
participants showed an increased capacity to integrate bad news
into prior beliefs. Increased physiological arousal and self-
reported anxiety were found to correlate with enhanced integra-
tion of unfavorable information into beliefs. In Experiment II,
firefighters on duty who reported higher state anxiety also exhib-
ited greater selective integration of bad news. Because the in-
crease in information integration in both experiments was
valence specific, it cannot reflect a general improvement in learn-
ing, and because memory for the information presented was not
affected, modulation of attention is an unlikely explanation.
The finding that the positivity bias in belief updating alters
flexibly as a function of perceived threat reveals a potentially
adaptive mechanism. In particular, the relative failure to incor-
porate bad news into prior beliefs leads to positively biased beliefs
(also known as the optimism bias). This bias can lead to both
positive effects, including increased exploration (Berger-Tal and
Avgar, 2012) and motivation (Bandura, 1989), and negative ef-
fects, including failure to take precautionary action. It has been
Table 4. Parameter estimates of covariates in Experiment II









First estimates 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.97 0.02 0.02 0.00
Prior experience rating 0.03 0.09 0.31 0.76 0.21 0.15 0.00
Number of bad news trials 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.99 0.03 0.03 0.00
Information integration
parameter, good news (G )
0.34 0.16 2.17 0.04 0.02 0.67 0.18
First estimates (i.e., mean initial estimations), mean ratings of past experience, number of bad news trials, and G
(information integration parameters for good news) were entered as covariates to account for fluctuations in B
(information integration parameters for bad news).
Figure 5. State anxiety in firefighters differentially relates to integration of good and bad
news. Subjective state anxiety scores of firefighters on shift were related to larger information
integration from bad news (bi  0.03, p  0.008, p
2  0.26) and lower information integra-
tion from good news (bi 0.045, p  0.038, p
2  0.17), correcting for possible confounds.
Plotted are the partial regression plots for bad news (a; partial B) and good news (b; partial
G) from two separate linear models (one for bad news and one for good news) that control for
additional covariates.
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suggested that overestimating the likelihood of attaining rewards
and underestimating the likelihood of harm is adaptive in envi-
ronments where potential gains are sufficiently greater than costs
(Johnson and Fowler, 2011). This is because under uncertainty,
optimistically biased individuals will claim resources (e.g., a
spouse or a job) they could not otherwise attain, as better but less
optimistic competitors may walk away from the fight. Moreover,
overestimating the value of novel environments can lead to an
increased rate of exploration allowing the opportunity for the
true value of an environment to be learned quicker (Sutton and
Barto, 1998; Berger-Tal and Avgar, 2012), which is associated
with superior performance in behaviors such as reproduction
(Egas and Sabelis, 2001) and foraging (Rutz et al., 2006). How-
ever, in environments where potential harm is considerably
greater than potential reward, computational models suggest the
optimism bias to be disadvantageous (Johnson and Fowler,
2011). Thus, a valence-dependent bias in information integration
that disappears under threat could be optimal in enabling a more
accurate assessment of risk.
In our experiments, the source of the threat was unrelated to
the information content of the task. Thus, acute stress had a
valence-specific, yet general, effect on how participants used in-
formation to alter their beliefs (i.e., in response to a social threat,
participants did not selectively increase their response to infor-
mation about social judgment but to negative information in gen-
eral). Indeed, many threat induction methods, including threat of
electric shock, Cold Pressor Tasks, and the Trier Social Stress
Test, produce general changes to behavior and neural responses
that are not confined to the source of the threat itself (Cavanagh
et al., 2011; Youssef et al., 2012; Otto et al., 2013; Robinson et al.,
2013; Lenow et al., 2017). Similar findings have been observed in
nonhuman animals, where different stressors have been shown to
alter the degree of positive biases in a range of decision-making
tasks (Harding et al., 2004; Matheson et al., 2008; Rygula et al.,
2013). This may be adaptive, as threat may signify a dangerous
environment that requires a general enhancement of caution.
However, if perceived threat is prolonged or dissociated from
reality, enhanced integration of negative information over long
periods of time could lead to psychiatric problems. We have pre-
viously shown that patients suffering from major depressive dis-
order (MDD) exhibit increased updating of beliefs in response to
negative information relative to healthy controls (Garrett et al.,
2014). MDD is often triggered by a stressful life event (Caspi et al.,
2003; Roiser et al., 2012). In individuals predisposed to MDD,
such a stressful life event (or series of such events) could result in
prolonged periods of perceived threat and thus increased sensi-
tivity to negative information. This in turn can form pessimistic
beliefs, a symptom of MDD (Strunk et al., 2006; American Psy-
chiatric Association, 2013), leading to even greater perceived
threat about one’s environment. It is possible that a similar mech-
anism may contribute to symptoms observed in other clinical
pathologies such as in clinical anxiety and phobia.
We speculate that stress in response to perceived threat may
interfere with top-down control mechanisms that may normally
inhibit integration of unwanted information (for review, see Yu,
2016). A second, not mutually exclusive, possibility is that the
stress reaction directly boosts the neural representation of esti-
mation errors generated from bad, but not good, news. Indeed, it
has been shown that negative prediction errors in dopamine-rich
striatal nuclei are selectively amplified under threat (Robinson et
al., 2013), a modulation that could be mediated by stress-induced
changes to dopamine release (Schultz et al., 1997; Frank et al.,
2004; Lemos et al., 2012; Sharot et al., 2012a). Future studies are
required to test these hypotheses.
In summary, our results provide evidence that asymmetric
information integration is not set in stone but changes acutely in
response to the environment, decreasing under perceived threat.
Such flexibility could be adaptive, potentially enhancing our like-
lihood to respond to warnings with caution in environments
where future costs may be high but enabling us to maintain pos-
itive beliefs otherwise, a strategy that can, on balance, increase
well being.
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